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This paper aims to disentangle patterns ofaid, trade,
conflict and migration between Canada and Sri Lanka,
illustrating the surprisingly significant traffic between
the two countries and exploring the significance and
quality of these connections. International aid to Sri
Lanka is closely related to the opening ofmarkets to
multinational investment beginning in 1977. This
economic liberalisation overlaps with periods ofconflict
in Sri Lanka and ofmacroeconomic growth. The
prosperity it has generated, however, has not benefited
all social classes and ethnic groups. Accordingly,
conflict in Sri Lanka has been characterised by
uprisings led by unemployed youth, peaceful and
violent protests ofdiscrimination against Sri Lankan
Tamils and militarised government reprisals to both. A
long period ofmacroeconomic growth ended in the final
quarter of200 I, after the bombing ofcommercial
airliners at Sri Lanka's international airport.
Geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions in Sri Lanka
changed dramatically. In this context, Canada's
International Development Agency (CIDA) and other aid
agencies aspire to 'correct for conflict' and promote a
democratic and peaceful Sri Lanka through peace-
building and other aid measures. Militarised conflict
over at least the past 20 years has generated massive
human displacement both within and beyond the
country's borders, spawning international migrants in
search ofasylum. In 1999, Sri Lanka was the leading
source country of refugee claimants to Canada.
Canada hosts the single largest Sri Lankan diaspora of
any country. By examining the nexus ofeconomic
liberalisation and aid, I analyse its relation to conflict
in Sri Lanka and migration to Canada.
Cette dissertation a pour but de dimeler I'icheveau
des ichanges commerciaux, conflits, migrations et
assistances entre le Canada et le Sri Lanka, iIIustrant
le niveau surprenant des ichanges entre les deux
pays et explorant la signification et la qualiti de ces
connexions. L'assistance internationale au Sri Lanka
est itroitement liie a I'ouverture des marchis aux
investissements multinationaux qui commen~aen
1977. Cette libiralisation iconomique s'accompagne
de piriodes de conflit et de croissance macro-
iconomique au Sri Lanka. Cependant, la
prospiriti qu'on lui doit n'a pas profiti a toutes les
classes sociales eta tous les groupes ethniques. En
effet, les conflits au Sri Lanka ont iti caractirisis
par des rivoltes de jeunes au chomage, des
manifestations protestataires pacifiques et violentes
de discrimination contre les Tamils du Sri Lanka et
des reprisailles gouvernementales militaires dans
les deux cas. Une longue piriode de croissance
macroiconomique s'est terminie durant le dernier
trimestre 200 I, apres le bombardement d'avions de
ligne a I'airoport international du Sri Lanka. La
situation giopolitique et gioiconomique du Sri Lanka
prit alors un virage abrupt. Dans ce contexte,
I'Agence canadienne de diveloppement international
(ACDI) et d'autres organismes d'assistance aspirent a
« remidier au conflit » et a favoriser I'itablissement
d'un Sri Lanka dimocratique et pacifique par le biais
de mesures d'idification de la paix et d'autres
mesures d'assistance. Les conflits militarisis qui
durent depuis au moins 20 ans ont produit des
diplacements massifs de population a l'intirieur
et a I'extirieur du pays, criant des migrants
'Sri Lanka peace deal forged on Canada's federal
model' proclaims a 6 December headline on the
front page of The Globe and Mail (Knox 2002). The
article outlines the role of former Ontario Premier
Bob Rae in briefing government and rebel negotia-
tors on Canadian federalism during four days of
peace talks in Oslo. Canada, among others, has
long been a point of reference for constitutional
model-builders in Sri Lanka. The rebel Tigers said
they admired Canada's system because it includes
mechanisms for self-determination, such as the
1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty.
Conflict is increasingly globalised in terms of its
antecedents, negotiations and outcomes. While
conflict within the borders of a given country has
largely replaced conflict between and among
states as the prevailing framework of waging war,
the migration implications of 'civil war' invariably
seep beyond borders, generating an international
context of response. The globalisation of the econ-
omy has also generated a significant degree of
integration among nation-states. Migration tends,
for example, to follow routes forged initially
through bilateral economic and/or foreign policies
(Sassen 1993).
An examination of transnational social, economic
and political relations between Canada and Sri
Lanka offers an opportunity to disentangle patterns
of aid, trade and investment, conflict and migration
both in a bilateral context and at a coarser global
scale. For Sri Lanka, access to major funders of
multilateral aid has been contingent on the opening
of markets to multinational investment beginning
in 1977. This turn toward economic liberalisation,
scholars have argued, sowed the seeds of the
current conflict (Gunasinghe 1984; Sivanandan
1990). There is considerable evidence that the
fruits of these policies, based on steady macroeco-
nomic growth in terms of gross domestic product
(GDP), have not reached all segments of Sri Lanka's
internationaux demandeurs d'asile. En 1999, le Sri
Lanka fut pour le Canada le pays generant le plus
grand nombre d'immigrants demandant le statut de
refugies. Le Canada est le pays qUi abrite la plus
grande diaspora srilankaise au monde. En exami-
nant la connexion entre la liberalisation economique
et I'assistance, j'analyse ce qui la lie au conflit au Sri
Lanka et d la migration au Canada.
population. Decades of continuous economic
expansion ended in July 2001 after 13 commercial
airliners were destroyed in a rebel attack on Sri
Lanka's international airport at Katunayake. While
Sri Lanka's conflict is not a direct result of economic
liberalisation, in my view, the economic damage
and acute perceptions of instability after the 2001
airport attack do correspond to the recent impetus
for peace. Such relationships· point to the import-
ance of political economy in understanding the
war, and to the precariousness of a peace that
might be negotiated in the context of economic
crisis. Peace at any price is neither a viable nor a
desirable option.
International assistance to Sri Lanka aims to cor-
rect for conflict and to promote a democratic and
peaceful Sri Lanka where economic prosperity, in
capitalist terms, may flourish. In terms of policy,
Canadian aid contributes to a liberal democracy,
with plans for accountable governance and sound
economic policies in a well-managed, neoliberal
economy. In 2000, Sri Lanka was the sixth largest
country of immigration to Canada and its second
largest source of refugees (CIC 2001). International
migrations are embedded in larger social, eco-
nomic and political processes, including foreign
aid and investment policies and migration
programs that shape the movement of people in
nonrandom ways (Sassen 1996).
Extending this line of argument, immigration to
Canada is best understood as a recursive and
dynamic process that galvanises extant links with
the countries from which newcomers emigrate.
Immigrants do not simply abandon the social, eco-
nomic and political connections of the place that
they leave behind when they move to a new home
(Basch, Glick SchiIIer and Szanton Blanc 1994;
Mountz and Wright 1996; Faist 1999; Bailey et al.
2002). Many send remittances to family, friends
and political causes, and some sponsor relatives
to join them in their adopted country. Refugees, in
particular, are likely to maintain different kinds of
contact and linkages abroad after settling in
Canada (Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000;
AI-Ali, Black and Koser 2001). Burmese refugees
in Vancouver, for example, hold ongoing fundrais-
ing activities to raise political awareness of
human-rights violations in Burma and to assist
other Burmese still struggling in Thai refugee
camps. Conflicts that involve the abrogation of
human rights and related forced migration, as in
Burma and Sri Lanka, are not geographically
contained within the borders of the countries in
which they occur.
While 'civil war' in Sri Lanka technically occurs
within the borders of the state, transnational ties
generated by asylum-seekers and other migrants
are part and parcel of the current conflict. The war
in Sri Lanka is based on competing and territorially
rooted Tamil and Sinhalese nationalisms, but the
conflict is also perpetuated by those who are eco-
nomically marginalised. These relations of conflict
are by no means mutually exclusive. Unemployed
men and women from southern Sri Lanka can enlist
as soldiers and earn handsome salaries that enable
them to support their families. Unemployment
among both Tamil and Sinhalese youth has been a
major factor contributing to the war (The Econo-
mist 2000). Economic liberalisation to attract
foreign investment has not eliminated high
unemployment rates, despite the introduction of
free-trade zones and export-oriented activities.
Remittances to the rebel Tigers, whether voluntary
or extorted, also have the effect of protracting a
war that might otherwise be short-lived (Wayland
2002). Those who flee their homes to seek safety or
restore livelihoods may leave Sri Lanka to become
part of this remitting diaspora. The conflict is not,
then, a domestic matter. Asylum-seekers and other
migrants from Sri Lanka seek new homes in
Canada, India, Europe, the United States, Australia
and elsewhere.
In what follows, current practices of Canadian aid
disbursements in Sri Lanka are juxtaposed with
current aid policy at Canada's International Devel-
opment Agency (CIDA). Other exchanges between
Canada and Sri Lanka, such as remittances and
migrants, are also explored. The next section briefly
traces the contours of contemporary conflict in Sri
Lanka before moving on to examine external econo-
mies of influence and aid and their implications.
Sri Lanka in Conflict
Sri Lanka has experienced war since at least the
1983 pogroms, in which thousands of Tamils in
Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital, were murdered
and had their property looted and homes burned. 1
The pogroms were retaliation for the killing of 13
highly ranking Sinhalese Sri Lankan soldiers by the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, on the
Jaffna Peninsula (Swamy 1996). Almost 100,000
Tamils in Colombo were displaced, and many
Tamil neighbourhoods were destroyed. 'There
was hardly any Tamil family that escaped death,
destruction or displacement' (Suryanarayan 200 I,
1). Anti-Tamil violence left 90 percent of Tamil-
owned shops and businesses completely
destroyed (Cheran 2000). The recent conflict
between the LTTE and the government of Sri
Lanka can be traced back to a series of violent
confrontations beginning at this point (Spencer
1990; Jeganathan and lsmail 1995; Tiruchelvam
1996).
Well before the pogroms, the introduction of the
1956 Sinhala Only Act stirred up communal antag-
onism and generated considerable resentment
among Sri Lankan Tamils (Gunasinghe 1987). This
act declared Sinhala to be the only official
language, removing Tamil as one of the state-
sanctioned languages. The political controversy
generated by the act was exacerbated by a scheme
in the 1970s to standardise examination marks for
entrance to university so those writing exams in
the Sinhala medium required fewer marks than
those written in Tamil (Sivanandan 1990). Before
1956, Tamils were proportionately overrepre-
sented in the civil service because of their high
achievement of English-language proficiency.
Until 1956, this was their passport to government
employment. As Cheran (2000, 110) argues, 'The
class dimension of the Sinhala Only Act must not
be forgotten .... The battle of the languages was in
reality a battle for government jobs.' Unemploy-
ment among the majority Sinhala youth generated
considerable political pressure for the government
to act in a manner that ironically consolidated
identity based on nation, despite the economic
antecedents of such identity formation.
1 In fact, a series of pogroms in 1977, 1979 and 1981 preceded
those of 1983 (Cheran 2000, 113).
The conflict in Sri Lanka has spawned large-scale
displacement within the country and well beyond
its borders, where a significant Tamil diaspora has
emerged. There are more than 800,000 internally
displaced persons in Sri Lanka, and the death toll
now exceeds 60,000 (Refugee Council 2002). The
brutality of the war is demonstrated by the fact
that few or no combatants are captured alive and
taken as prisoners of war (National Peace Council
2001). Some 40,000 families live in government-
run 'welfare centres', and the remaining 140,000
families make temporary arrangements for refuge
with family and friends (Perara 2001). Mass
displacement, multiple displacements, long-term
displacement and attacks on communities of dis-
placed persons amid widespread militarisation
across Sri Lanka present massive challenges to
humanitarian and development organisations-
both national and international-that provide
assistance to such groups. Estimates suggest
that the vast majority of those displaced-78
percent-are of Tamil background, 13 per-
cent are Muslim and 8 percent are Sinhalese
(Suryanarayan 2001). Displacement has occurred
more than once for many households, sometimes
within the borders of Sri Lanka and sometimes
beyond. The implications of such multiple dis-
placements on one's livelihood and well-being
cannot be easily documented, though the
impetus to seek a safer, more stable life else-
where becomes clear.
A ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the govern-
ment and the LTTE was drawn up in February 2002
and was still holding at the time of writing. The
CFA has meant that a number of military check-
points have been dismantled and that major trans-
portation routes to northern and eastern Sri Lanka
have been reopened. In July and August 2002, for
example, unprecedented numbers of pilgrims
made their way to the Our Lady of Madhu Shrine
in the northern province of Sri Lanka, near
Vavuniya: 300,000 and 400,000 visited for the July
and August festivals, respectively (Bishop Rayappu
Joseph of Mannar, personal correspondence 26
November 2002). Nonetheless, no peace agree-
ment or plan for the demobilisation of the warring
factions has yet been reached. Preliminary peace
talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan govern-
ment were held in September, November and
December 2002, with plans for future talks. On 24
November 2002, Sri Lanka's warring parties made
their highest-level contact in 12 years in what was
hailed 'a landmark meeting' to consolidate the bid
to end Asia's longest-running ethnic conflict (Globe
and Mail2002a). Tamil rebels, however, rejected a
U.S. appeal at the meeting to renounce violence
(Globe and Mail2002b).
Human rights continue to be violated by both
sides, despite the ceasefire agreement. 'Despite
repeated promises by the LTTE to end their use of
child soldiers and to halt extortion of money and
property from civilians in the north and east, these
practices have continued. Human Rights Watch has
received numerous reports of such incidents since
February' (Human Rights Watch 2002; UTHR (J]
2002a). The CFA does not formally acknowledge
human-rights issues faced by civilians. Human
Rights Watch also points out the
urgent need to eliminate or reform the government's
Prevention of Terrorism Act and to release the hun-
dreds of detainees held by the Sri Lankan authorities
without trial under its draconian provisions. Most of
these detainees are Tamils arrested on suspicion of
links to the LTTE. Many of them were arrested
months or even years ago pending investigation,
with no evidence to support police suspicions
beyond their own confessions-often extracted
under torture. (HRW 2002)
Similar observations have been made closer to the
conflict and are worth quoting at length. The group
University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna)
(UTHR (J)) remarked that
We find that there is a lack of critical scrutiny of the
ongoing peace process, particularly, among the civil
society. The UNF [United National Front] government
appears desperate to sustain the peace process as it
sees the process as the only way to stabilise the
economy outside the North and East.... [W]e are
increasingly being pushed into polarised positions,
for the MoU [memorandum of understanding or cease-
fire agreement] or against-without being able, cri-
tically and constructively, to engage with the
ongoing peace process. What we have now is most
NGOs avoiding reporting human rights violations in
the Northeast by the LTTE. This they do in vain hope
of not rocking the peace boat. ... What is needed now
more than ever is a genuine push to monitor and report
all human rights violations whether by the LITEor the
Government. (UTHR [J] 2002a; emphasis added)
During a two-week visit in June 2002, Derek Evans,
head of a delegation for Amnesty International,
was more optimistic: 'Human rights in Sri Lanka
have improved as a result of the cease-fire but
the situation will remain vulnerable until the gov-
ernment and the LTTE take steps to guarantee a
human rights framework for the peace process'
(Amnesty International 2002). Taken together, the
unprecedented high-level meeting between the Sri
Lankan prime minister and the negotiating leader
of the LTTE and the warnings of human-rights
groups provide mixed signals for the prospect of
peace.
The current ceasefire opens up a precarious
space for optimism, one that is highly circum-
scribed by ongoing human-rights violations and
concerns that peace should not be negotiated
at any price. As in so many other conflict
zones (Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Bosnia-
Herzegovina), civilians have been the target of real
or potential violence.2 Civilians are the main
casualties of Sri Lanka's war, if not in terms of the
death toll, then most certainly in terms of the dis-
possession toll. Although Sri Lanka's war is char-
acterised as one of 'ethno-nationalist conflict', the
idea that it is based on tensions internal to the
country tells only part of the story. I aim to extend
this argument by illustrating how transnational
processes shape political and economic conditions
in Sri Lanka by elucidating the ways in which (1)
international lenders, investors and donors influ-
ence Sri Lanka's economic policy, (2) conflict
spawns migration beyond the country's borders
and (3) Sri Lankans abroad remit to their families
and contribute to this conflict at home. 3
2 As Boutwell and Klare (2000) have argued, 60 to 80 percent of
casualties in contemporary warfare are civilians, and Sri Lanka is
no exception.
3 It is important to point out that many Sri Lankan Tamils abroad
do not support the LTTE, and that their contributions are some-
times made unwillingly.
The sophistication of the LTTE's financial apparatus is also
demonstrated through an extensive tracking system. The LTTE
in Sri Lanka keeps records of people liVing and working abroad,
their earnings, and-through connections in local banks-the
amount of money they send back to their families in Sri Lanka.
When money is sent to a particular household, a LTTE represen-
tative in Sri Lanka visits the household and asks for a portion of
the funds.... Fear of the Tigers is clearly evident within portions
of the Tamil community (CSIS n.d., 6).
-------~--~~~~~~~~-----------,
Nonaligned to Realigned: Sri Lanka's
Integration into the Global Economy
Foreign assistance and development aid during the
Cold War were as much about forging geopolitical
allies and proving the superiority of capitalist
economies as they were about remedying the
'underdevelopment' of nonaligned Third World
nations. W. W. Rostow (1960), a major proponent
of capitalist industrialisation as the superior
means to 'develop' a country, even called his
treatise The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto. Eurocentric data, tautological
reasoning and Cold War posturing aside, Rostow's
theory of modernisation is interesting because of
its focus on the nation-state as an independent
object of development (McMichael 1996). Depend-
ency theorists in Latin America were qUick to
criticise Rostow's theory for a variety of reasons,
principally because it failed to take into account
power relations between the First and Third
worlds, including unequal trade relationships and
terms of exchange that emerged from the colonial
period (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Mittelman 1988).
The appropriate response, argued dependency the-
orists, was not to copy the export-oriented
capitalist model of the 15 European countries ana-
lysed in Rostow's study, but to substitute locally
made goods for imported ones as a step towards
self-sufficiency.
While criticisms can also be made of dependency
theory, these theorists forced Rostow and his allies
to look beyond the borders of impoverished
nation-states for an explanation that included
external economies of trade and finance. Virtually
no country has been able to escape the influence of
the economic liberalisation measures that were to
follow, as many Third World countries became
increasingly indebted to First world banks in
their efforts to modernise. These contrasting
conceptions of where the problem of underdevel-
opment lies (that is, within Third World states
versus between First and Third world states) may
appear tangential to the analysis put forth, but
they point to parallel arguments about the scale
of analysis that are explored later in the paper.
From the colonial experience, Sri Lanka (or
Ceylon, as the country was called until 1972)
inherited an export economy in tea, rubber and
coconuts that was prosperous but dependent on
international market conditions and terms of
trade (Stokke 1998). State socialism 'and import-
substitution strategies characterised the Sri
Lankan economy immediately after independence
from Britain in 1948, a period in which political
power was rooted more in contested class forma-
tion and relations than in national identity or
ethnicity (Jayawardena 1990). Members of the
Sinhalese political elite, through a series of
patron-client relations, made general concessions
to the Sinhalese rural middle and lower classes in
order to be returned to power (Stokke 1998). From
the 1950s to the electoral victory of the United
National Party (UNP) in 1977, the government
appropriated significant sums from the economy
and redistributed some of the surplus through var-
ious economic and social development programs
(Gunasinghe 1984).
Postcolonial import-substitution industries cre-
ated economic growth for a time in the early
1960s, but this growth was soon constrained by a
saturated domestic market and a lack of competi-
tiveness in the export market (Stokke 1998). '[T]he
system of quotas, permits and licenses, a product
of the policy of import substitution, made state
patronage essential for any individual or commer-
cial venture in the private sector' (Gunasinghe
1984, 199). From the late 1950 onward, the econ-
omy was hamstrung by the inability to finance an
adequate level of imports (Moore 1990). The cost
of import-substitution policies was high, and
included extremely high unemployment rates
among educated middle-class and lower-middle-
class youth (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1994).
The early 1970s was characterised by 'a deepening
accumulation crisis of democratic socialism and
equally severe legitimation crises for Tamil and
Sinhalese class alliances and political networks'
(Stokke 1998, 101). These crises were manifested
in a series of local confrontations that were part of
the coordinated insurgency of the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, or People's Liberation
Front) in April 1971. The insurgents were com-
prised largely of unemployed and underemployed
youth from the rural petty bourgeoisie and middle
peasantry (Stokke 1998, 101).
In the mid-1970s, the Sri Lankan government
unsuccessfully requested loans from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). This changed with the
election of the UNP government in 1977, at which
time Sri Lanka opened its markets to unbridled
capitalist development and export-oriented indus-
trialisation; at the same time, it promised to create
a just and free society that included Tamil-
speaking people.4 Within two weeks of taking
office, however, police burnt down the market in
Jaffna, sparking a reign of terror and violence
against Tamils throughout the country (Sivanandan
1990, 236). The newly elected prime minister,
J. R. Jayewardene, did little to quell the violence.
At the same time, the state abandoned its regulatory
role as provider to the poor, handing over control
of the economy to the private sector (Gunasinghe
1984; Cheran 2000). Economic liberalisation meant
an end to many of the concessions that held ethnic
and class alliances together (Stokke 1998). Newton
Gunasinghe (984) takes this argument a step
further and argues that there is a direct link between
economic liberalisation and the anti-Tamil violence
between 1977-1983, and that this violence trig-
gered the civil war between the Sinhalese-
dominated state and militant Tamil separatists.
While capitalism began to flourish, Tamil areas
remained largely excluded from investment
(Sivanandan 1990,241).
With the opening of Sri Lanka's economy to for-
eign investment in 1977, the IMF and the World
Bank did come to Jayawardene's financial aid with
major loans, in exchange for devaluation of the
rupee and cuts to welfare programs. Western aid
experts followed with plans for the establishment
of a free-trade zone, a large hydroelectric dam pro-
ject and an international tourism industry. A major
prerequisite for all of these investments was poli-
tical stability. This was assured in September 1978
by a new constitution that was pushed through
parliament in three weeks, strengthening execu-
tive power in the office of the president. 'And if
investors needed further reassurance, Article 157
stipulated that no future government could revoke
or alter any treaty or agreement entered into-on
the basis of a two-thirds majority in parliament-
with a foreign state or "its nationals ... corporation,
companies and other associations" for the
"promotion and protection of their investments'"
(Sivanandan 1990, 238).5 Once foreign investment
arrived in Sri Lanka, it was carefully protected by
4 Sri Lanka was the first in South Asia to liberalize its economy in
1977 (The Economist 2000).
S Gunasinghe (1987, 66) argues that '[E]thnic consciousness
acquired pronounced expression and the major ethnic commu-
nities in Sri Lanka drifted apart from one another through the
competitive economic and political processes'.
the state. The security and predictability of invest-
ment, if not political stability per se, were key
requirements for foreign involvement in the Sri
Lanka economy. In return, foreign aid flowed
freely. 'In the early 1980s Sri Lanka became, on a
per capita basis, one of the most heavily aided
nations in the world' (Moore 1990, 354).6
Economic liberalisation did not signal 'any hard
choice between liberalising the economy or meet-
ing demands for political patronage. For the rapid
and massive inflow of foreign aid and the conse-
quent expansion of the absolute and relative size
of the public sector ... provided abundant patron-
age resources' (Moore 1990, 352). Sri Lanka had
become a favourable partner in the eyes of bilat-
eral and multilateral aid and finance institutions
due to its commitment to economic deregulation
and free-market policies and its relatively demo-
cratic status in terms of human rights and welfare:
Here indeed was a deal waiting to be made. But it was
implicitly a package deal, and one which had visibly
to be in place rather quickly. Continued support
from the World Bank and IMF would implicitly be
contingent on enthusiasm for Sri Lanka in interna-
tional business circles and in the foreign and trade
ministries of the industrialized countries. But for-
eign capital would look at Sri Lanka again only if
the new government could reverse the country's
reputation for political radicalism and electoral
instability. Hence a whole series of urgent policy
measures to create a new business image. (Moore
1990, 354-355)
Distinct from Gunasinghe's argument, Mick Moore
refutes any causal link between economic liberal-
isation and violence, but contends that the large
net increase of foreign aid that accompanied open
markets, along with a larger and more salient pub-
lic sector in Sri Lanka, may well have encouraged
and sustained authoritarian practices. Stokke
(1998) notes that during the 1970s, groups of
marginally employed urban dwellers were
financed by these new public investments as
part of an institutionalised 'thuggery' throughout
the country. Those holding the purse-strings
could control rebellious elements at arms length
6 In 1985, gross aid disbursements comprised 56 percent of
government capital expenditures and 19 percent of total
government expenditures (Moore 1990).
by hiring from this cohort whose tactics were
punitive.
Despite the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka since
1983, macroeconomic growth has been steady
over the past two or more decades (Sriskandarajah
2002). In documenting the basic contours of eco-
nomic growth, foreign direct investment (FDI) and
official development assistance (ODA), the impact
of these changes becomes evident. Per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) shows steady gains since
1975, as noted in Table 1. While these are impres-
sive gains on paper for investors in Sri Lanka and
their government counterparts who received loans
and aid in return, however, they do not measure
the distribution of this newfound wealth, if any,
among different segments of the population.
Table 2 illustrates the increase in private capital
flows, especially foreign direct investment (FDO,
in relation to much larger flows of official
development assistance, draWing from a collation
of data by Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah (2002).
While FDI increased four-fold over eight years,
levels of ODA dropped off significantly during
this same period. The platform of President Chan-
drika Kumaratunga's party in 1994 was based on
the forging of a peace agreement with LTTE. The
LTTE withdrew from the talks, however, soon after
Kumaratunga's People's Alliance was elected.
Official development assistance appears to have
dropped off as the war intensified and the govern-
ment sought a military solution to the conflict.
The Sri Lankan economy grew at an average of
4.7 percent between 1980 and 1999 (The Economist
2000), despite the conflict that prevailed through
much of the period. In 2000, per capita GDP had
the highest value in terms of purchasing power
parity over the previous 25 years, at US$3,530
(UNDP 2002). That same year, the economy grew
Table 1
CDP per capita in 1995 USS, selected years, Sri Lanka
Year CDP/Capita
1975 382
1980 452
1985 536
1990 590
1995 700
1999 802
SOURCE: UNDP (2001); Sriskandarajah (2002).
-- ----------------------------------------------~
Table 2
Sri Lankan foreign direct investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA) and debt indicators, 1990 and 1998
Year
1990
1998
FDI in
US$ Millions
43
193
ODATotal in
US$ Millions
780
490
ODAas US$
per Capita
43
26
ODA as % of CNP
9.3
3.2
External Debt Total in
US$ Millions
5,863
8,526
External Debt as
%ofCNP
70.0
54.9
SOURCE: Sriskandarajah (2002).
at a rate of 6 percent (Government of Sri Lanka
2002). In 2001, this fell to -1.4 percent-a precipit-
ous decline coincident with the heightened con-
sciousness of political instability after July 200l.
Remittances to Sri Lanka constitute another
dimension of economic integration beyond its bor-
ders. While the aggregate data shown in Table 3
cannot be broken down into remittances between
Canada and Sri Lanka specifically, the growth of
remittances generally is worth noting. In recent
years, private remittances to Sri Lanka have
exceeded FOI to the country by three to four
times; they have exceeded foreign assistance con-
tributions by two to three times, and comprised
about 15-20 percent of export earnings, or 5 percent
of gross national product (GNP) (Sriskandarajah
2002, 10). Both labour migration and forced
migration based on asylum contribute to remit-
tance revenues. To some extent, labour migration,
too, is predicated on the conflict, which has left
many displaced Sri Lankans with no local
livelihood, spawning the migration of household
members abroad (Brun 2002).
Sri Lanka's shift from a nonaligned socialist state
based on a postcolonial export economy to a more
Table 3
Total private remittances, selected years, for Sri Lanka
neoliberal state characterised by export-oriented
industrialisation has met with mixed results. On
the one hand, macroeconomic growth has been
relatively steady since 1977, when trade liberalisa-
tion was introduced. Political stability and the
material prosperity of all Sri Lankans, however,
have been elusive. The LTIE and the government
of Sri Lanka have been at war throughout most of
this period. Ironically, remittances contribute a
growing portion of the country's export earnings
and help many households secure income that
they can no longer access within the country. Yet
many of the migrants who send funds to Sri Lanka
were themselves refugees and are now liVing
abroad as immigrants or citizens of other coun-
tries. The war did not appear to have interfered
with macroeconomic growth in Sri Lanka until
2001, with negative growth in the final quarter.
While the airport bombing and the events of
September 11, 2001 have contributed, in my view,
to this economic crisis, my purpose here is not to
explain why the economy sank so quickly, but to
note the coincidence of these events with the
current CFA and peace talks. I now move to Canada
to examine the relation of the Sri Lankan Tamil
diaspora to its country of origin. Having com-
mented on remittances in general, I articulate
more fully the shape and scope of the diaspora
and connections between the two countries.
Year
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
1999
SOURCE: Sriskandarajah (2002).
US$ Millions
9
152
292
401
790
1,050
The Tamil Diaspora in Canada
Sri Lankan Tamils have been called the 'asylum
diaspora', reflecting the claims that they have
made in order to stay in the countries in which
they have sought protection (McOowelI 1996).
Like other diasporas, Sri Lankan Tamils are scat-
tered and dispersed across the globe, with concen-
trations in Canada, India, Europe, Australia and the
United States. Estimates of the Tamil diaspora in
Canada range from between 110,000 and 200,000
(Wayland forthcoming) to 400,000 (Sriskandarajah
2002). To a population of fewer than 2,000 Tamils
in Canada in 1983 (Aruliah 1994), more than
25,000 were added between 1984 and 1992; in
the 1991 census, Tamils were the fastest-growing
ethnic group in Metro Toronto (Cheran 2000).
Canada's Tamil population is thought to consti-
tute the largest Sri Lankan diaspora in the world
(Wayland forthcoming), and Toronto is 'the city
with the largest number of [Sri Lankan] Tamils in
the world' (Cheran 2000, 170).7 This diaspora,
significant in terms of both size and concentration,
maintains strong ties with Sri Lanka.
Aihwa Ong (1999) speaks of 'flexible citizenship'
in reference to the condition of interconnected-
ness and mobility that people experience across
space in an increasingly integrated world. Such
citizenship, she explains, 'refers to the cultural
logics of capitalism, travel and displacement that
induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunis-
tically to changing political-economic conditions'
(Ong 1999, 6). Much has been made of trans-
national ties-referring to the continuous social,
political and economic fields that traverse inter-
national borders-that the LTTE maintains with
members of the Tamil diaspora. In a Canadian
context, some media analyses reflect reactionary
or anti-immigrant positions, based on an undiffer-
entiated and highly problematic assumption that
all Tamils in Canada are Tiger supporters:8
The Tigers aren't the only international terrorist
group that raises money in Canada, but they
have certainly been one of the most effective,
generating by one estimate more than $22 million
last year to finance a wave of ethnic warfare in north-
eastern Sri Lanka that has left 60,000 dead....
7 Cheran (2000) points out that recent population estimates
for the district of Jaffna are 200,000, implying that the
city Jaffna hosts fewer people than the district. The entire Jaffna
peninsula is thought to have approximately 550,000
persons, considerably fewer than it hosted before the conflict
in 1983.
8 It should be noted that not all immigrants to Canada from Sri
Lanka are of Tamil background. Sinhalese and Muslim Sri
Lankans have also settled in Canada.
9 Rohan Gunaratna is a research associate at the Centre for
Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of
St. Andrew's in Edinburgh (Sengupta 2000).
While it is impossible to know exactly how much
money is raised in Canada to support the LTIE,
Dr. Gunaratna9 estimates that more than $12 million
in donations were collected last year, as well as $10
million in business revenues. (Bell 2000)
Multiple news media and intelligence sources,
however, chronicle these economic and political
connections.
The CSIS [Canadian Security Intelligence SerVice]
report. .. says that between [Cdn]$I-$2 million is
raised here each year for the Sri Lankan guerrilla
group, making Canada one of the largest con-
tributors worldwide, and alleges that some of the
money is being channeled to the LTTE's weapons-
procurement arm in Thailand. (Munasinghege 2000)
So oceans away from the mass graves and suicide
bombers that have become hallmarks of the civil war,
the Tamils of Toronto hold pledge drives on Tamil
radio, fill tills on shop counters and solicit money
door-to-door in Tamil neighborhoods. Experts
estimate they send anywhere from $7 million to $22
million a year [from Canada] in direct and indirect
support for the guerrillas. (Sengupta 2000)
'As far as a list of countries is concerned, Canada is
the worst culprit with regard to funding,' said
Canada's High Commissioner in 1995 (Morris
1995; Wayland forthcoming, 21). 'Certain months
of the year are known to be fundraising months
when Tamils can expect someone from the com-
munity-often a former Tiger militant-to come by
and collect money for the cause. Some Tamils wel-
come this visit, while others refer to it as extortion'
(Wayland forthcoming, 21). Canadian weekly
Maclean's claimed that Tamils targeted for dona-
tion were asked to pay 6 percent of their gross
income to the Tigers (Kaitha 1996; see also
Wayland forthcoming). Tamil leaders in Canada
have argued that these estimates are overstated,
and that most money remitted goes back to family
members and relief organisations (Morris 1995;
Wayland 2002).
FollOWing the events and in the aftermath of
September 11 2001 (9/11), the LITE's links to Canada
have made more headlines and captured more atten-
tion. Canada designated the LTTE as a terrorist
organisation under federal financing regulations
on 7 November 2001 (Bell 2001). Political scientist
Sarah Wayland (forthcoming) has analysed the
relation of the TamiI diaspora to the conflict.
Wayland (forthcoming, 4) argues that a transnational
opportunity structure connects Sri Lankan Tamils
in the Canadian diaspora with those in Sri Lanka:
'[T]he formation of identity networks in the TamiI
diaspora has enabled the Liberation Tigers of
TamiI Eelam (LTTE) or Tigers to engage in
protracted insurgency against the Sri Lankan
government army'. Wayland (forthcoming, 16)
links ongoing identity formation to information
exchange within the Tamil community via TamiI-
language newspapers, radio, the Internet and
ethnic organisations, awareness-raising of the
Tamil struggle through marches, conferences and
the lobbying of government officials, and lawful,
as well as unlawful, fundraising. She notes that all
of these activities reinforce an independent Tamil
identity-and, I would add, a Tamil nationalism
the imagined homeland of which is TamiI Eelam.
Cheran (2000, 210) has eloquently argued, how-
ever, that this Tamil nationalism has 'failed
to evolve into an inclusive national liberation
project'.
Nevertheless, the scope and organisational capa-
city of the Sri Lankan TamiI diaspora in Toronto is
remarkable. A bilingual TamiI community direc-
tory of businesses and services for this commu-
nity, thamilar mathiyil (Amidst TamiIs), has been
published since 1990 and has grown to several
hundred pages in length. There are ten weekly
TamiI language newspapers, four TamiI language
radio stations and three cinemas that show TamiI
language films (most are produced in TamiI Nadu).
Toronto is also home to the largest Tamil video
and music store in the world (Cheran 2000). 'The
major community organizations, the TamiI Eelam
Society of Canada and the World TamiI Movement
(WTM), are pro-LTTE organizations' (Cheran 2000,
181). The TamiI Eelam Society is the also largest
ethnospecific provider of social services to Tamils
in the province of Ontario (Wayland forthcoming).
These organisations and businesses point to
transnational ties between Canada and Sri Lanka,
but are more indicative of the sizeable presence of
Sri Lankan Tamils who left their country during the
conflict and of the politics they bring to these
organisations.
Turning to Canadian aid to-and trade with-Sri
Lanka, this analysis of the conflict recognises links
among international governments, nongovernmental
organisations (NGOs), the Sri Lankan government,
the LTTE and Sri Lankans living overseas. IQ As
Mark Duffield has noted, protracted conflict is
an expression of local and global processes
(cited in Goodhand and Hulme 1999, 19). Without
a strong understanding of 'new political formations
emerging on the global periphery,' humanitarian
aid will be incorporated into the fabric of political
violence (Duffield 1996, 173). International fund-
ing of either party to the Sri Lankan conflict has
obvious political implications for the nature of the
conflict, but even humanitarian and development
assistance provided by donors to NGOs that declare
neutrality may have political consequences.
The CIDA: Promoting Peace and
Stability through Good Governance
Long before foreign direct investment and remit-
tances became significant to the Sri Lankan econ-
omy and to the LTIE, Canada was loosely
associated with Sri Lanka through its membership
in the British Empire and Commonwealth. Through
these connections, the first Sri Lankan immigrants
came to Canada beginning in 1951, via Britain.
They brought with them impeccable educational
credentials and middle-class standing (Vaitheespara
1999). These immigrants were at once a legacy
of the common colonial regime and subject to
the largely exclusionary measures of a white
settler society in Canada. II Canada's connections
to Sri Lanka were galvanised in January 1950 at the
10 Trade between Canada and Sri Lanka is modest but increasing,
especially for Canadian imports of Sri Lankan goods. Canada
was Sri Lanka's thirteenth largest destination country in terms
of exports in 1997, but this represents only 1.2 percent of Sri
Lankan exports. Canadian exports to Sri Lanka represent less
than 2.5 percent of Sri Lanka's total imports (Department of
Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka 2001). When the provisions of
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement terminate in 2005, as ordered by
the World Trade Organization, Sri Lanka's stature within the
garment sector will be tested. Until now, 'quota hoppers' in the
East and South Asian markets have taken advantage of the
unused quotas in Sri Lanka to produce apparel at competitive
prices (Moore 1990). Nonetheless, it produces a wide range of
apparel on continuous contracts for brand names such as the
Gap, Liz Claiborne, Tommy Hilfiger, Abercrombie and Fitch,
Ralph Lauren and others. Sri Lanka's three export-processing
zones and relatively inexpensive labour make it an appealing
location for foreign direct investment (FDO.
11 South Asians who tried to land on Canada's West Coast 50 years
earlier, were largely excluded by regulations that prevented
them from doing so (Mongia 1999).
Commonwealth Conference on Foreign Affairs,
held in Colombo (Colombo Plan 2001). The meet-
ing's deliberations included a pledge to draw up
development programs that would provide a
framework for international cooperation among
Commonwealth countries. This intergovernmental
initiative became known as the Colombo Plan, a
plan that continues to shape the economic and
social development in the Asia-Pacific region
today. 12
Canada's International Development Agency
(CIDA) has delivered assistance to developing
countries such as Sri Lanka over the past three
decades. Canada's development aid to Sri Lanka
is based, in part, on a tradition of assisting
those within the Commonwealth (Zukowsky 2001).
Despite the agency's recent announcement of a
new policy espousing, among other things, greater
geographic concentration of Canadian aid in fewer
countries (CIDA 2002), Canada is unlikely to cut off
bilateral aid to Sri Lanka given these longstanding
ties (interviews A and B). At roughly Cdn$5.5 mil-
lion per year, the CIDA's bilateral contributions to
Sri Lanka are relatively modest (George 2001). This
bilateral commitment is not significant enough to
put Canada on the 'top ten' list of donors of net
official development assistance, which is topped
by Japan (US$167 million) and followed by the
Asian Development Bank (US$94 million) and the
World Bank (US$59 million) (Sriskandarajah
2002).13 Additional multilateral funds and monies
provided by the office of the Canadian High Com-
missioner in Sri Lanka to NGOs such as CARE and
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF Holland) push total
12 I thank Terry McGee for pointing out this link, as well as the
parallel connections that were formed through Canada's mem-
bership in the Francophone association of countries.
13 These statistics require more analysis. Does the end of the Cold
War, of which development assistance was a key political com-
ponent, mean that development aid is outdated, redundant,
politically less attractive, especially in a country destabilised
by war? Between 1992 and 1998, total assistance from the
countries comprising the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) declined from US$60.8 billion
to US$51.5 billion, and aid as a percentage of GNP in these
countries fell from 0.33 percent to 0.23 percent (Therien and
L10yd 2000). There is evidence to suggest that development
aid is declining, while 'soft money' for voluntary contributions
to humanitarian crises is increasing. Aid transfers that enhance
stability in recipient countries by increasing economic growth
and preventing possible out-migration are already in place
(Macrae and Leader 2000; Duffied 2001).
Canadian contributions in Sri Lanka up to approxi-
mately Cdn$l 0 million (interview C).
The manner in which Canada's bilateral assist-
ance is delivered is unusual: 'In light of the present
conflict, since 1991, Canada's assistance to Sri
Lanka is channelled exclusively through NGOs and
institutions that can address the political, social
and economic causes of the conflict' (CIDA n.d.;
interview C). While this is categorised as a 'bilat-
eral' assistance package, Canada is the only donor
in Sri Lanka that does not fund government minis-
tries or programs directly. Nonetheless, the CIDA
is the fourth largest contributor to programs based
in the conflict-ridden parts of northern and eastern
Sri Lanka.14 Canada is also the only donor in Sri
Lanka with a peace-building fund, established to
promote human rights and democratic values in
this war-torn country (interview C). Based on the
abysmal human-rights records of both parties to the
conflict in recent years, the CIDA continues to avoid
funding government budgets (interview C and F).
Doing development in a war zone is a difficult
undertaking at best, given the risk that aid may be
diverted to fuel the conflict, either directly or
indirectly. 'Development success can be a peace-
building failure' (interview G). CIDA has avoided
funding capital-intensive projects-the conven-
tional 'bricks and mortar' approach-opting
instead for 'knowledge-based' training and pro-
jects to enhance institutional and community-
based capacity-building (George 2001; de Alwis
and Hyndman 2002; CIDA 2002).15 Community-
14 The war has generated 'border areas' and 'lines' demarcating
territories controlled either by the LTTE or the Sri Lanka Army.
Some of these spaces overlap: a road may be controlled by the
Sri Lankan Army by day and the LTTE by night-for example, in
the Nilaveli part of Trincomalee District. We collected reports
of women who were raped on one side of the 'line' by perpe-
trators who then returned to the other side to escape detection
and conviction for their crimes. There are literally two economies
of accountability and justice at work. sometimes within a
given town.
15 Many ClDA dollars are allocated to World University Services of
Canada (WUSC) in Sri Lanka, an NGO that has in place a long-
term social and economic strategy to upgrade skills among
those liVing in war-affected areas. Between 1998 and 2000,
the CIOA funded WUSC to retrain 2,461 persons, the majority
of whom are Tamil and Muslim (CIOA n.d.). It is important to
note that people living in Tamil-dominated areas such as the
Wanni, Trincomalee and Batticaloa areas are not allowed to
leave their home areas without government permission, and
even then only for short periods and good reason. Thus, this
training prOVides a constructive local activity to those otherwise
dispossessed by the war.
------ ----------------------------------------------,
based training initiatives avoid diversion of funds
by paying for vocational programs and enhancing
'human capital' in a politically unstable climate.
Due to the constraints imposed by conflict,
peace-building activities among civil society
groups also constitute a major budget item (inter-
views 0 and E). The CIOA's stated aims are to
promote economic reforms, human rights and
democratic values in Sri Lanka by promoting
peace initiatives among Muslims, Sinhalese and
Tamils in the country (CIOA n.d.).
While improving access to or quality of educa-
tion may seem like a nonmilitarised and safe
investment, however, such aid is at risk of being
deployed for other means. Parents in LTTE-
controlled areas of Sri Lanka have avoided sending
their children to school because it is considered a
training and recruitment ground for the Tiger rebel
group (UTHR [j] 1999 10). Entire classes of stu-
dents have disappeared to serve as LTTE cadres
under the leadership of their teachers. Similar pro-
jects in the government-controlled areas can also
prove problematic. The government is in a pos-
ition to pour more money into the defence industry
and to fortify its military position in the current
conflict if it knows that aid disbursements of funds
for education, health and social services will be
provided by international donors. These scenarios
illustrate the potentially negative political impact
of donor aid, but they certainly do not justify its
withdrawal. The terms attached to aid, however, are
an important consideration for all parties concerned.
The new ClOA
In the context of Sri Lanka, Moore (1990, 341)
pointedly asks, 'Is there a positive symbiosis
between the liberal economy and the liberal
polity?' Put another way, is there a correlation
between capitalist economies and democratic
state? Generally speaking, he says, historical evi-
dence provides a positive answer. Moore notes,
however, that economic liberalisation as a con-
scious and urgent attempt by the state to bring
about particular changes in the economy is dis-
tinct from a noninterventionist path of economic
development. The political correlates of economic
liberalisation are more ambiguous. Nonetheless,
the peaceful liberal polity has become both the
prerequisite to and the promise of foreign aid in
post-Cold War and post-9/11 contexts.
Development agencies are beginning to reinvent
themselves and their policies in relation to coun-
tries affected by political instability. Those that are
considered 'unstable' may be reformed through
appropriate changes to economic policy and gov-
ernance processes (CIOA 2001, 2002). As promoted
by the World Bank (I998), development aid is
becoming increasingly conditional upon political
stability and open markets. If peace is considered
a precondition for prosperity (Sivanandan 1990),
then development aid may be an incentive for recipi-
ent countries affected by conflict to cooperate
with donor agencies (Macrae and Leader 2000).
Such conditionality on aid may impute a colonial-
ism of compassion in which donors dictate the
terms of assistance (Hyndman 2000). Questions of
whose peace and on whose terms are pressing ones
in the context of aid programming that aims to
integrate trade and foreign policies more closely
with development assistance under the gUise of
'international cooperation'. In highlighting the link
between aid and peace, development objectives
become increasingly tied to security agendas
(Ouffield 2001).
In Sri Lanka, any peace agreement. that allows
markets to flourish while spaces of dissent for
Tamil civilians rapidly shrink under increasing
LTTE control is unlikely to usher in peace. As the
UTHR (J) (2002b) recently noted, '[T]he right to
organize politically, to speak out, to elect repre-
sentatives and for schools and offices to function
normally are invaluable assets to a healthy peace
process ... Nothing tangible has been done to
enhance the dignity and security of Tamils and in
the event of war it will be back to square one'. One
academic and activist I interviewed maintains that
peace initiatives funded by foreign donors and
implemented by Sri Lankan NGOs would do little
to change current arrangements: 'The question
is how to challenge the status quo ... from out-
side the liberal economy of power' (interview H).
Understanding the impact of 'NGOisation' (Lang
1997) or the building of civil-society institutions
financed by foreign donors represents an important
area for further research, particularly in long-term
conflict settings such as Sri Lanka. Another infor-
mant illustrates a similar point in relation to the
CIOA's programming, arguing that Ahimsa, a CIOA-
sponsored peace group named after one of Gandhi's
political concepts, distorts the concept's history
and meaning. In Gandhi's day, when there was a
British colonial monopoly on salt, Gandhi organised
a march to the sea to make salt. In so doing, he
acted outside the legal structures of government.
His act of civil disobedience challenged the legiti-
macy of the law itself by contesting accepted rules
and norms of organised politics (interview I). That
foreign donors are wary of supporting things that
are outside the legal structures of government is
understandable and no doubt appreciated by the
government in power. Their strong, liberalising pre-
sence in the country, however, has significantly
transformed how civil-society dissent-excluding
political parties and trade unions-is now imagined
and practiced (interview H). The limits of a liberal
peace become apparent.
The CIDA has embarked on its path of reforming
development assistance with the recent release of
'Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy
on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness' (CIDA 2002).
The policy aims to reward Iow-income developing
countries that demonstrate 'sound' (Le., competi-
tive, open-market) economic policies and 'good
governance' (Le., stability and Iow levels of corrup-
tion). Similar policies have been implemented in
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the U.S.
(Macrae and Leader 2000). This new direction
brings together development agencies, foreign
policy and international trade departments and
financial institutions in a number of donor coun-
tries and across several government departments
in each country to coordinate development
programming, enhance investment potential and
promote security in 'nonstrategic' developing
countries. As such, it points to the integration of
development aid with trade and security policies.
This approach also promotes a shift from
bilateral project-based programs of development
activities to more multilateral macroeconomic
sectoral approaches based on partnerships with
governments. '[T]he realities of globalization and
growing international interdependence are lend-
ing increased weight to a rationale for aid based
as well on "enlightened self-interest" or mutual
benefits. The emphasis here is on long-term inter-
ests, which are shared by all countries, rather
than on narrow national interests' (CIDA 2001).
'International cooperation' appears as the catch-
word for a unified and multilateral approach to
prOViding development aid. What is interesting
about Canada's position, among those of other
donors, is the conditionality of aid. Open markets
and good governance become prerequisites for full
bilateral aid. In the case of Sri Lanka, this policy
has yet to be put to the test (interview C). An
improved human-rights record on the part of
both the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE
would be part of any governance audit and a pre-
reqUisite for full bilateral relations between the
two countries. Canada's policy to 'strengthen aid
effectiveness' is reminiscent of economic liberal-
isation measures of the 1970s in Sri Lanka, when
loans and development aid were predicated on
open markets and neoliberal economic policies.
One goal of the CIDA's new policy, in general
terms, is to mitigate migration from developing
countries by enhancing economic development
and political stability in them.
Interdependence means that there is a convergence
of interests among states around a wide array of
issues-the environment, peace and security, health
and the suppression of disease, economic and finan-
cial stability, migration and transnational crime. All
states have interests in these issues-which can also
have a strong values base-and advancing these
interests requires, to a grOWing extent, improved
international cooperation ...
... Canada's border is long and open to both com-
merce and people. Since disease does not need a
visa, we cannot be healthy in an unhealthy world.
(CIOA 2001, 4,7; emphasis added)
This new direction in development policy at the
CIDA has an important security dimension. A
clear set of geopolitical concerns is articulated in
relation to development aid and policy. This
excerpt also points to a retrograde geopolitical dis-
course in which individual Third World nation-
states are the source of disease migration, and
transnational crime. As with Rostow's analysis of
deficient development, the problem to be solved
by aid agencies lies within such nations, not in
their external trade relations with or degree of
economic integration into First World countries.
Given the external economic relations that Sri
Lanka and other developing countries maintain
with investors, migrants, donors and traders, this
framing of the problem as lying within a country's
borders involves a particular invocation of scale
that is untenable. Despite the documented net-
works of aid, trade, investment and remittance,
------------------------------------------------------
Migration to Canada
the CIOA's policy highlights a desire to maintain a
clear boundary between 'us' and 'them'. Yet Sri
Lanka continues to be a major source of immigra-
tion to Canada.
Transnational connections between Sri Lanka and
Canada are an expression of conflict and displace-
ment in Sri Lanka and constitute a continuous
sociospatial field between the two countries. Con-
flict and war are not simply 'domestic' problems
when they produce refugees and/or refugee claim-
ants, many of whom seek new homes in Canada.
Table 4
Immigration to Canada by top ten source countries, 1991-2001
This section traces migration patterns between the
two countries, noting that Sri Lanka is a significant
'sending' county to Canada in terms of migration
and outlining reasons for these links.
Sri Lanka is a relatively small country of 18.8
million people, more geographically distant from
Canada than Europe. Yet in the year 2000, Sri Lanka
was the sixth largest source country of immigrants
to Canada, sending 5,841 people, or 2.57 percent
of Canada's immigrant total (CIC 2001). Between
1991 and 2001, Sri Lanka was the fifth largest
source country of immigrants to Canada, after
China, India, the Philippines and Hong Kong (see
Table 4). In the refugee category, Sri Lanka ranked
second between 1998 and 2000 (see Table 5) and
was the largest refugee-sending country in 1995.
Toronto has been the destination for the vast
majority of these immigrants, who comprised the
fourth largest immigrant group to that city in 2000
(see Table 6).
The relative importance of the Sri Lankan immi-
grant group appears to be growing. For a country
of less than 19 million people, it is remarkable that
Sri Lanka compares with the much more highly
populated countries of China, India, Pakistan and
the United States as a major sending country to
Canada. Between 1992 and 1999, Sri Lanka was
the leading source country of refugee claims to
Canada (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1993, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). Because
Canada's inland refugee determination system is
not restricted by targets or administrative limits,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Rank
10.8%
8.S%
6.7%
6.S%
3.4%
3.2%
2.9%
2.8%
2.6%
2.4%
% of ImmigrantsCountry
China, People's Republica
India
The Philippines
Hong Kong
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Taiwan
The United States
Iran
Poland
a Except Hong Kong.
SOURCE: Globe and Mail, 2003
Table 5
Refugees to Canada by top ten source countries, 2000
1998 1999 2000
Country # % Rank # % Rank # % Rank
---------- --
Yugoslavia 559 2.45 14 629 2.58 13 3,831 12.75 1
Sri Lanka 2,132 9.34 2 2,611 10.70 2 3,234 10.76 2
Afghanistan 1,354 5.93 4 1,816 7.45 3 2,537 8.44 3
Iran 1,477 6.47 3 1,447 5.93 4 1,503 5.00 4
Pakistan 724 3.17 9 1,088 4.46 7 1,235 4.11 5
Somalia, D. Republic 1,195 5.23 6 1,380 5.66 5 1,209 4.02 6
India 853 3.74 8 697 2.86 10 1,107 3.68 7
Iraq 947 4.15 7 915 3.75 8 982 3.27 8
Republic of Zaire 609 2.67 11 696 2.85 11 947 3.15 9
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3,590 15.72 1 2,698 11.06 1 839 2.79 10
SOURCE: ClC (2001).
-- -----------------------------------------------------
Table 6
Immigration to Toronto by top ten source countries, 2000
1998 1999 2000
Country # % Rank # % Rank # % Rank
China, People's Republic 8,757 11.47 1 13,696 16.22 1 18,305 16.94 1
India 7,484 9.80 2 9,126 10.81 2 15,600 14.44 2
Pakistan 5,885 7.71 3 6,512 7.71 3 10,478 9.70 3
Sri Lanka 2,626 3.44 8 3,590 4.25 4 4,142 3.83 4
The Philippines 3,087 4.04 6 3,287 3.89 5 3,909 3.62 5
Korea, Republic of 1,699 2.22 10 2,998 3.55 7 3,457 3.20 6
Iran 3,715 4.86 4 3,133 3.71 6 2,983 2.76 7
United Arab Emirates 1,324 1.73 14 1,221 1.45 16 2,214 2.05 8
Russia 2,690 3.52 7 2,263 2.68 8 2,126 1.97 9
Jamaica 1,868 2.45 9 1,984 2.35 9 2,025 1.87 10
SOURCE: CIC (2001).
any person who arrives at a Canadian port of entry
has the right to claim refugee status. This has
clearly proven the most suitable category of
migrant status for Sri Lankan Tamils. Approval
rates have been comparatively high, with 80
percent of claims heard approved in 1999 and 77
percent in 2000 (U.S. Committee for Refugees 2000,
2001). In contrast, the United States has main-
tained strong relations with the government of Sri
Lanka (Wayland 2002) and has officially declared
the LTTE a terrorist group since 1997. The United
States hosts about 40,000 Sri Lankan Tamils-a
fraction of those in Canada, both in terms of
absolute numbers and as a proportion of the
population (Sriskandarajah 2002).
Many Sri Lankans-particularly Tamils-are
leaving or have left their country because of the
conflict. In such cases, destinations may be not so
much a question of choice as a question of where
family relations are based and, hence, where spon-
sorship opportunities exist, or where governments
allow access to asylum hearings through legisla-
tion and policies. Canada maintains a large immi-
gration program, significant networks of Sri
Lankans in diaspora and comparatively generous
refugee legislation and adjudication policies.
Allowances to facilitate the additional processing
of Sri Lankan Tamil asylum-seekers in the late
1980s contributed to the growth of the diaspora
in Canada (interview C).
Sri Lanka is also objectively a good source of
immigrants based on its population's education
levels, related skills and official language ability. 16
It fares far better than its South Asian peers in
terms of literacy (91.6 percent), longevity (79
years) and general education levels (UNDP 2002).
While more research on the quality and extent of
migration between the two countries needs to be
done, the significance and momentum of migra-
tion is clear.
Concluding Connections
IwilIjust say that large-scale international migrations
are embedded in complex economic, social and ethniC
networks; highly conditioned and structured, they
are by no means a free-for-all. Reality thus belies the
popular dramatic images of massive invasion by the
poor. Immigration is really more of a management
problem than a crisis. (Sassen 1996, 63)
The multiple connections between conflict, aid
and migration, traversing the spaces between
Canada and Sri Lanka, suggest a distinct geopol-
16 Canada has attracted a number of internationally renowned
writers from Sri Lanka, including Michael Ondaatje and Shyam
Selvadurai. Interestingly, both writers were/are members of Sri
Lankan society who have not always been made to feel welcome
at particular times. Ondaatje's family was of Burgher ancestry
(a Creole mix of Dutch and Sinhalese cultural backgrounds), a
group that was made less welcome after 1956, when the Sri
Lanka government introduced a Sinhala-only language restric-
tion for those working in the public sector. Selvadurai is of
Tamil background, and despite his family's relative privilege
and urban base, they left Sri Lanka because of the 1983 riots.
itics and geoeconomics of migration. 17 Trans-
nationalism-including transnational migration-
is not simply a theoretical perspective but, as
illustrated here, a nexus of social, political and
material relationships that blur the centrality of
international borders and replace conventional
cartographies with maps that chart social, eco-
nomic and political fields that traverse such bor-
ders on an ongoing basis. Transnational economic
liberalisation policies comprise these networks, as
do international concerns for security in the after-
math of 9/11 and the war on terrorism.
In examining the connections between Sri Lanka
and Canada, my goal has been to analyse the rela-
tion of aid, economic liberalisation and migration
to conflict in Sri Lanka. With the shift to open mar-
kets and the influx of foreign aid and loans in the
1970s, patronage relations were maintained and
extended based on significant public-sector
investment. Such relations infused Sri Lankan pol-
itics with particular class and ethnic alliances that
have undoubtedly played a role in Sri Lanka's
ongoing conflict. Despite various overtures of
peace since 1983, no ceasefire or rapprochement
has appeared as promising as the current one. The
somewhat sudden push for peace is welcome, but
it should be scrutinised and monitored to ensure
that it is not simply a push to restore profitability
to a desperately damaged economy. Peace at any
price will do little to restore stability and security
to Sri Lanka, and is likely only to hasten the migra-
tion of more Sri Lankans to Canada.
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